wittgenstein

wittgenstein
naming: every word has a meaning (Wittgenstein critiques this approach) to see naming as a central feature of language is primitive and will lead you astray

language (symbols, words, sentences) are used in countless different ways naming is just a primitive preparation for the real use of language language doesn't have a perfect sense, there is no essence, to pursue essence is a chimera

language is like a game the meaning of game cannot be abstracted satisfactorily from instances of games olympic games, board games, card games, ball games "we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities in detail" ie. no essence to games

meaning of a particular word, phrase or sentence is best construed by its use

language as a "conceptual boat"

the language game of mental states - our ability to use words leads us to think mistakenly that "knowing", "believing", "wanting" etc. must be inner mental states does a pre-verbal child believe that milk exists? (in behaving in a way that causes an adult to give it more milk) or does it behave as though it believes milk exists? does an adult believe milk exists? (or has just learnt behaviour?)

We first learn words in place of behaviours "a child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and later sentences. They teach the child new pain behaviour

'So you are saying that the word "pain" really means crying? - On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it'"

The meaning of the word "pain" is its use in the language game of mental states

Mental state expressions do not refer to or name some private inner object. That would be as though everyone had a box with a "beetle" in it but nobody could look in each others box.

Grammar attempts to "force itself upon us". "Philosophy is a battle against bewitchment of our intelligence by the means of language"

Words are useful. It is useful to make sense of our behaviour through the attribution of mental states (like "know", "believe", "want") but that does not mean they are real entities. These names are not essences.

There is not a neat causal relationship between behaviour and mental processes. Just as there is not a clear relationship between "paint strokes on a canvas" and "what someone looking at it sees"

"The tendency to explain instead of merely describing leads to bad philosophy"

reference:
Kerry Miller. Literature review: Theory of Mind (1996). Unpublished